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1. History of Ballistic Missile Defense
Ballistic missiles were first used by Nazi Germany against Antwerp and London.
At that time, ballistic missile defense was technologically limited to air-burst artillery fire
to deflect or destroy incoming missiles. During the Cold War period, the superpowers
kept each other in check by refining the ballistic missile concept and building large
numbers of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Their defenses consisted of
nuclear air-burst interceptors, with reliance on the concept of Mutually Assured
Destruction. In 1972 the United States and the former Soviet Union signed the Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. This treaty placed specific limitations on the size,
number, and speed of each nation's defensive capability. Today, missile defense is
segmented into two broad categories. Strategic systems defend a continental-size area
from inter-continental or sea launched ballistic missile attack, and theater systems defend
a smaller region from ballistic missile attack. The ABM Treaty places most of its
limitations on strategic systems.
Development of a United States strategic missile defense system has been an
intermittent project for several decades. Portions of the technologies required for this
military capability are available, but an integrated system does not now exist. Our current
national strategy gives priority to developing and fielding theater missile defense (TMD)
systems, while keeping the strategic systems in a Technology Readiness Program. This
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strategy places emphasis on the greatest threat. As the threat to the United States grows,
the National Missile Defense (NMD) system can be accelerated from a Technology
Readiness Program. This strategy permits NMD fielding if needed, and allows the
opportunity to leverage-in mature TMD technologies. This thesis is a case study of the
acquisition strategy for the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.
THAAD is a high priority TMD system currently in development.
2. Ballistic Missile Threat
In the post-Cold War period, the threat of a large scale ICBM attack against the
United States is practically non-existent. On the other hand, the medium range tactical
ballistic missile (TBM) threat is diversifying, growing faster than ever, and can carry
weapons of mass destruction. Today, more than 30 types of TBMs exist. Nineteen
nations possess missiles that can carry a payload of 1,000 kilograms to a range greater
than 300 kilometers [Ref. 1: p. 34]. A growing number of countries are working on
missiles with ranges greater than 1,000 kilometers.
The PATRIOT missile system's role during Operation Desert Storm brought some
public attention to TBMs and our severely limited defensive capability. During the Gulf
War, once Iraq launched a TBM, the PATRIOT PAC-2 (PATRIOT Advanced Capability-
2) missile was the only defense. The allied nations deployed almost every PATRIOT fire
unit in the world to the region, but PAC-2 missiles provided only limited coverage for top
priority political assets. Tactical and strategic assets were virtually unprotected.
TBMs are a threat to our forward deployed forces and the homelands of many of
our allies. Given the current growth rate, a limited ICBM threat to the United States
homeland will reappear. The question, currently receiving much political debate, is how
soon this threat will reappear?
3. Legislative Mandate
In response to the growing threat, Congress passed the Missile Defense Act of
1991. This legislation required abrupt new steps toward deployment ofNMD and TMD
systems. The Act, signed into law December 5, 1991, required the Secretary of Defense
(SEC DEF) to have an operationally effective TMD capability by 1996. The law gave
the SEC DEF 180 days to present a Department of Defense (DOD) plan to meet the 1996
deployment deadline. [Ref. 2]
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), formerly Strategic Defense
Initiative Organization, is the DOD organization responsible for coordinating
development of missile defense capabilities. In response to the 180 day mandate, BMDO
planners reviewed the ballistic missile threat compared to our existing and future missile
defense technologies. Because the ABM Treaty was a constraint on available options, all
options were classified as treaty compliant or treaty non-compliant.
4. Options Available
One promising TMD option was THAAD. It appeared that THAAD would be
effective against the growing threat and be treaty compliant. Additionally, THAAD could
demonstrate a significant technology maturity to the NMD Technology Readiness
Program. Figure 1 is the author's depiction of the situation BMDO faced in 1991. Threat
capability is graphed in the background. It was ahead of our existing TMD capability,











Figure 1. THAAD Acquisition Strategy - Traditional Approach
PATRIOT (i.e., PAC-3) would bring some defense against the threat, but a new
generation weapon system was required to outpace the threat. Development ofTHAAD
would provide a foundation for our capability to outpace the threat well into the next
century. Under a traditional acquisition strategy, the Initial Operational Capability (IOC)
ofTHAAD would be at least ten years away. This time frame was unacceptable to
BMDO planners because it would not provide the urgently needed TMD capability for
our forward deployed forces and many of our allies.
A traditional acquisition strategy could not meet the urgent need and fulfill the
legislative mandate. Therefore, BMDO planners conceived the User Operational










Figure 2. THAAD Acquisition Strategy - User Operational Evaluation System Approach
BMDO's innovative approach to meet the threat. This aggressive strategy produces an
interim operational prototype, which may be used in a variety of ways to enhance the
objective system. Additionally, the strategy provides for the prototype system to be
available for deployment in the event of a national emergency. This aggressive strategy
was a direct response to the Congressional mandate to rapidly develop a TMD capability.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to examine UOES as an innovative acquisition
strategy. The author will examine trade-offs made within the program among cost,
schedule, and performance. From this examination, lessons-learned will be identified that
will aid acquisition management personnel in making informed decisions about selection
of a UOES acquisition strategy for future programs.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In pursuit of the objective of this thesis, the primary research question is: What
are the lessons from the THAAD program that will be helpful to other acquisition
managers in minimizing cost, schedule and performance risk?
The subsidiary research questions are:
1. What are the specialized requirements that drove the program to its
operational prototype strategy?
2. What are the key THAAD risks, and how has the acquisition strategy
addressed those risks?
3. What risks have been increased as a result of the strategy?
4. What advantages and disadvantages should acquisition managers
consider before including an operational prototype in an acquisition
strategy?
D. SCOPE
THAAD is in the final year of a four year demonstration and validation
(DEM/VAL) contract. Flight test five of 14 DEM/VAL flight tests took place on March
22, 1996. Final data analysis of this test is still pending. Therefore, this thesis is based
on observations prior to test five. Because this is an ongoing program, a complete study
of the effectiveness of the acquisition strategy is not yet possible. However, an
examination of the decision making process and the dynamics in the acquisition
environment that have thus far influenced the THAAD program is beneficial.
Analysis is of the THAAD program issues only. THAAD will be a major element
in the Active Defense pillar of Joint Theater Missile Defense (JTMD) doctrine. When
relevant, there is some comparison ofTHAAD issues to other programs facing similar
situations.
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
This thesis is a case study of the acquisition strategy used in the THAAD
program. First, there is a background review ofDOD risk management; this is followed
by a review of some current uses of prototypes in systems development. Next, the
THAAD system and its innovative acquisition strategy is outlined. This background
information is then used to conduct an analysis of risk management issues related to the
acquisition strategy.
The author obtained background information from DOD reports, General
Accounting Office reports, professional papers, DOD publications, and THAAD program
documents. These documents were found through research in the Naval Postgraduate
School Library or from Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange. Much
information was obtained through visits to the THAAD Project Office (TPO) and to the
THAAD prime contractor, Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space Company (LMSC).
F. DEFINITIONS, ACRONYMS, AND POLICY CHANGES
The author uses standard DOD and Army definitions for acquisition management
and missile defense terms. Appendix A provides: (1) the definition of terms that have a
designated meaning in this thesis, (2) a consolidated designation of the acronyms.
Appendix B provides a summary of some recent trends related to risk management
terminology.
The author assumes the reader is generally familiar with the Department of
Defense Acquisition Management Process. This document is based on terms and policies
in effect in 1991 at the initiation of the THAAD program. Table 1 cross references the old
and new terms for acquisition phases as they are found in the 5000 Series of Department
of Defense Instructions.
Old 5000 Series (FEB 1991) New 5000 Series (MAR 1996)
Concept Exploration & Definition Concept Exploration
Demonstration & Validation Program Definition & Risk Reduction
Engineering & Manufacturing Development Engineering & Manufacturing Development
Production & Deployment Production/Fielding, Deployment, and
Operational SupportOperations & Support
Table 1 . Cross Reference of Old and New Terms used for Acquisition Phases
II. PROTOTYPING AS A RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY IN THE
ACQUISITION PROCESS
A. PURPOSE
An acquisition strategy sets a course for a program to follow throughout its life-
cycle. A PM should tailor the strategy to address unique risks or unknowns of the
program. A strategy's goal is to insure a program delivers a useable, supportable, and
reliable product within acceptable constraints of cost, schedule, and performance. This
chapter first examines how DOD acquisition strategies typically approach risk
management. Second, it overviews some current methods and applications of
prototyping. Finally, this chapter reviews some advantages and disadvantages of
prototyping. This chapter provides a framework for an analysis of UOES risk
management issues in this thesis.
B. RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1. Definitions
The Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) defines risk as "the
probability of an undesirable event occurring and the significance of the consequence of
the occurrence." [Ref. 3: p. 3-1] The first factor in this definition, probability of
occurrence, is associated with the prioritization of risks. Program managers (PMs)
should not overlook the second factor, significance of the consequence. Consideration of
the impact of an occurrence can enable a PM to progress away from strictly prioritized
risk management. When a PM considers both factors together, the result is a more
realistic expected value of the risk. With this more accurate assessment, the PM can
make more informed decisions. For example, the PM may choose to accept risks where
the probability of occurrence is high, but where the consequence of occurrence is
minimal. He or she can then more efficiently allocate resources toward the areas where
the expected pay-off is higher or total risk is lower.
2. Types of Risk
DSMC lists five facets, or types, of risk. [Ref. 3: pp. 3-3 - 3-6]
a. Technical Risk
This type of risk includes the complexities associated with developing a
new design to provide a higher level of performance or reconfiguration of one or more
mature designs for a new application. The predominant causes of technical risk are the
user's constant demand for greater performance and the high rate of technology
developments. A design that has high technical risk today may be less risky in the future
when the designers have access to improved resources and processing techniques. Some
major sources of technical risk are component interfaces, software design, requirements
changes, and demand for more performance.
b. Programmatic Risk
This type of risk refers to external forces that influence a program's
direction. External forces are outside a PM's span of control. Programmatic risks stem
from variance between the environment for which a PM planned and the actual
environment. Some major sources of programmatic risk are political advocacy, changing
funding profiles, and regulatory changes. A sudden shift in any of these external sources
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may produce a very disruptive ripple through a program. This disruption may result in an
inability to achieve desired performance within acceptable cost or schedule.
c. Supportability Risk
This type of risk is associated with fielding and maintaining systems that
are in development. Although a system is technically producible and has low
programmatic risk, unique technologies or maintenance requirements may result in a life-
cycle cost that is unaffordable. Some major sources of supportability risk are reliability,
maintainability, interoperability, transportability, and training.
d. Schedule Risk
Schedule risk is the probability that the actual time required to achieve
specific objectives will exceed the allocated time and the significance of this occurrence.
Some critical program management schedule issues are: the length of time required to
adequately resolve technical issues, time limitations associated with appropriated funds,
and system readiness to test when facilities are available.
e. Cost Risk
Cost risk is a product of the probability and impact of an actual cost that
exceeds the budgeted cost baseline. In turn, increased risk in other areas has a cumulative
effect on cost risk. Solutions to technical and supportability issues often require
additional funds to resolve. When a PM accelerates or stretches a schedule, there are
adverse effects on cost. An increased cost estimate tends to decrease political support.
This fluctuation may result in increased scrutiny, a funding profile that is stretched over a
longer period, or a fixed funding profile with a corresponding reduction in the number of
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units bought. Because cost risk is an indicator of risk in other types of risk, cost estimates
are harder to define when there is significant risk in other areas.
3. Risk Management Structure
There are four separate but related activities that are part of the DSMC risk
management structure. This structure helps a PM to develop an effective and responsive
risk management plan.
a. Risk Planning
The purpose of this activity is to eliminate, minimize, or contain the
effects of undesirable occurrences. Risk is present, to some degree, in every program at
every stage of development, production, or sustainment. Therefore, risk planning should
be a continuous process, and personnel from every functional area should contribute to
the process. PMs have a wide degree of freedom to tailor their Risk Management Plans
to their programs' unique needs. Most PMs formally assess their risks at least quarterly.
From this formal assessment, PMs allocate resources, as necessary, to keep their
programs within acceptable limits. [Ref. 3: p. 4-3]
b. Risk Assessment
This activity identifies risks and produces a preliminary quantification of
their probability and impact. During this activity the most critical step is identification.
This step entails a thorough phase by phase consideration of the program to seek out what
functions or technologies will be a risk to the program. The initial quantification step
makes a relative ranking of risk areas. [Ref. 3: p. 4-8]
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c. Risk Analysis
This activity builds on the preliminary assessment and produces an in-
depth sensitivity analysis of the areas having the greatest expected impact. Risk analysis
is essentially a war-gaming of various risk handling courses of action to determine
expected consequences. A key output of this analysis is a watchlist; this is a recognizable
list of critical risks in the program. A watchlist addresses potential risk events and the
areas impacted. [Ref. 3: p. 4-9]
d. Risk Handling
This activity includes the actions taken to address the risk issues that were
previously identified during a risk assessment. There are four management techniques to
influence the expected impact of a risk. [Ref. 3: p. 4-10 - 4-13]
• Risk avoidance includes basing a design on a low risk technology; however, a
strict risk avoidance policy results in a constraint on design flexibility and its




Risk control is the most common and most involved of the handling techniques; it
is a process of continuous monitoring and refinement of the program. To carry
out risk control, a PM establishes risk acceptance criteria and measurable
thresholds for risk. He or she uses these criteria and other relevant metrics to
monitor the watchlist areas and better determine their program's status in terms of
risk.
Risk assumption is a calculated decision to accept the consequences if the
undesirable event occurs. Not all risks can or should be avoided. For example,
schedule pressures may influence a PM to assume technical risk.
Risk transfer is similar to assumption, but using this technique a PM shares some
of the risk with another interested party. Co-development of a system is a method
to share a risk with other potential users. A PM may also transfer a portion of the
program's risk to the contractor by the type of contract, performance incentives,
or a warranty.
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C. PROTOTYPING AS A RISK HANDLING ACTIVITY
1. Prototype
A prototype is a model of a system design used to aid in development of follow-
on refined versions of the same system. A prototype may be full scale or reduced size.
Reduced size prototypes are based on assumptions about proportionality and scaling that
should be validated before commitment to a particular design. A model may be of a
complete system, or it may be a model of certain high risk modules of a complete system.
A model may be a fabrication of a portion of a system that focuses on immature and high
risk elements. It may not be necessary to integrate mature and low risk elements into the
structure. The purpose of a prototype is to answer four questions:
• Is the concept feasible?
• Does the design work the way it is supposed to work?
• Does the system provide a useful military capability?
• Does the design meet the performance requirement?
Answers to these questions provide feedback on technical and supportability risks.
Armed with this information, the concerned parties can make more informed choices
regarding risk management structure. This definition of prototyping and the focus of
these questions are key to understanding the usefulness of prototypes. [Ref. 4: p.2 ]
In response to a risk assessment, PMs may consider prototyping. Prototyping may
be a cost-effective risk handling activity to update and refine any assumptions made
during risk assessment and risk analysis. Prototyping may help avoid premature
commitment of production resources.
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Prototyping is a common acquisition management technique that provides
feedback on initial assumptions made in risk assessment and risk analysis.
Understanding technical risk is an immediate beneficiary of prototyping. Experience
gained from operating a prototype can also define supportability issues. Schedule and
cost indicators can be defined, and because prototyping requires a partial development,
these risks may be reduced for following development phases. Demonstrations of a
system's increasing effectiveness to sponsors may help reduce programmatic risk. Each
of these sources of feedback enables better decision making in risk planning and risk
handling.
2. Prototyping Methods
Information-age technology has produced a wide range of prototyping methods.
Traditional methods of prototyping range from hand carving scaled models out of
relatively inexpensive materials, to machining required materials at full scale and with
full functionality. Inexpensive scaled models provide considerably less feedback than full
scale operational models. Cost of the prototyping effort increases as the degree of
functionality increases. For some developments, traditional methods of prototyping are
too expensive and require more time than the expected feedback is worth. However,
many limitations associated with traditional methods of prototyping are quickly fading.
An explosion of new technologies is expanding the limits. New prototyping technologies
center around three interrelated prototyping methods, which are rapid component
prototyping, software prototyping, and virtual prototyping.
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a. Rapid Component Prototyping
Rapid component prototyping is an extension of progress in computer
aided design (CAD). CAD produces digital specifications for a part; then an automated
pattern-making machine uses that digital design. Master patterns for castings and metal
molds are made with little or no hard tooling. Rapid component prototyping takes a
matter of days, whereas traditional hard tooling could take months. This time-saving
advantage enables developers to experiment with various designs and materials.
Rapid component prototyping produces a physical product. Engineers
pass the item to users and sub-contractors; this aids in communication of expectations for
form, fit, and function. A physical example more effectively communicates technical
ideas to all audiences than traditional methods such as technical drawings. In the 1990s,
stereolithography (SLA) is a popular rapid component prototyping process among
aerospace contractors.
SLA units build plastic parts by mathematically slicing CAD designs into
thin cross sections. An ultraviolet beam traces each layer in a vat of
photosensitive chemicals that solidify as they are irradiated. After each
layer is completed, the elevator holding the part moves down about five
mils and the next layer is solidified on top of it. SLA machines produce
parts at a rate of one vertical inch every two hours. [Ref. 5: p. 19]
Rapid component prototyping enables use of better materials in the
process. Improved resins, molds, and adhesives result in rapid prototypes that more
closely resemble the objective product's characteristics. Other terms industry uses for
rapid component prototyping technology are desktop manufacturing, free-form
manufacturing, and 3-D printing systems.
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b. Software Prototype
Application of computer aided software engineering (CASE) techniques to
a previously manual software development process makes rapid software prototypes
possible. Communication of needs between user and designer is probably most difficult
in software development. Software is an abstract product that relies heavily on precise
definitions, functions and interfaces; these characteristics compound the software
requirements communication problem.
The literature addresses a variety of software design typologies, and some
software prototypes are called rapid software prototypes. Two dominant classes of
software prototypes are:
• Expendable - the code is discarded after it has helped to address the user's
requirements, and the prototypes are not reused in the final system.
• Evolutionary - the prototypes are iteratively built upon to achieve the objective
system, and prototypes are reused in the final system. [Ref. 6: p.4]
To overcome difficulties in communication of requirements, software
prototype developers produce a very limited prototype of what they think the user wants.
This original version prototype may be expendable or evolutionary. It usually contains a
very small percentage of the number of lines of code, objects, or feature points that the
objective system will contain. Users try the software to verify that developers have
addressed their problem. Users make their comments, and developers incorporate these
comments to refine the product to better fit user expectations. This process continues
until user and developer have addressed all the issues and reached an agreement on what
is a realistic product.
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A typical software prototype development process is:
• Identify basic requirements: identify essential features; completeness
is not important.
• Develop a working prototype: this should be accomplished very
quickly (e.g., an "overnight" development of a prototype).
• Implement and use: hands-on use of the system provides experience,
understanding, and evaluation.
• Revise and enhance: undesirable or missing features identified by the
user must be corrected. [Ref. 6: p. 7]
An example of software prototyping comes from Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL) at California Institute of Technology. JPL established a Flight Projects
Office Information Systems Testbed (FIST) to determine if it was possible to construct a
seamless networked telemetry processing system for use on space missions. JPL's
guidelines to the FIST team were to use commercial off the shelf (COTS) items, use
emerging industry standards for protocols and interfaces, and maximize portability across
different vendors' platforms. JPL's goal was to enhance its ability to efficiently take
advantage of an explosion in new hardware technology. Previously, infusion of new
hardware required a major redesign of JPL's telemetry processing systems. The FIST
team used an evolutionary prototype for the new architecture. The team selected this
approach for risk control, shortened development cycle, and accelerated technology
transfer. Two JPL engineers commented:
Unlike a throw-away prototype, which is useful when many of the
aspects of a design are untried, evolutionary prototypes are robust in
design and are built upon a foundation that is well-understood. It is a fast
and cost-effective method of proving out new concepts and accelerating
their simultaneous integration into operational environments and next-
generation products.
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Evolutionary prototyping concludes in the worst case with a small-
scale, limited distribution product for operational environments, and in the
best case leads to full-scale development of multi-user and multi-mission
systems. [Ref. 7: p. 466]
In summary, software development is a difficult and complex topic.
Software prototyping is an effective and widely used development tool. Use of software
prototypes allows developers to avoid investment of thousands of man-hours that
produces a grand software design, only to find their product is far from user expectations.
c. Virtual Prototype
Virtual prototyping is an extension of technologies that make both
component and software prototyping possible. Once a system design is
represented in a useable digital format, as required for component prototyping, a
prototype of the associated system's software can operate from that digital
database as if a physical system is on-line.
The DOD defines a virtual prototype as:
A computer-based simulation of systems and subsystems with a degree of
functional realism comparable to a physical prototype. Virtual prototyping
is the process of using a virtual prototype, in lieu of a physical prototype,
for test and evaluation of specific characteristics of a candidate design
[Ref. 8: p. 26].
An in-orbit repair of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) was possible
because of virtual prototyping. A problem with HST arose when, shortly after
deployment to its earth orbit, some of its ultra-sensitive lenses and mirrors failed to focus.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) scientists had a one-shot
opportunity for an in-orbit retrofit. Space Shuttle astronauts could deliver corrective
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mirrors to the telescope, but HST's design was too small for astronauts to work inside its
interior case. Astronauts could only place repair parts on motorized arms on the exterior
of HST. Engineers had to design corrective mirrors within the motorized arms' ability to
place them in a precise position inside the compact telescope. NASA had to be certain
the retrofit parts were sufficient to correct the improper focus and, at the same time, be
within the motorized arms' highly specialized capability. NASA turned to virtual
prototyping to define their limitations.
Such a prototype would be an accurate 'working model' of the Corrective
Optics Space Telescope Axial Replacement (COSTAR). It would exist
not as physical hardware but as numbers in a computer memory
representing COSTAR' s dimensions, optical characteristics, and the range
of motion of all its moving parts. [Ref. 9: p. 34]
A virtual prototype permitted NASA's engineers to perform tasks that
otherwise would have been impossible. It allowed engineers to "look" inside the HST,
from any angle with unrestricted access. NASA also experienced some spin-off
advantages from virtual prototyping. For example, they found it very beneficial in cross-
functional communication of specifications and interaction of intricate designs. In
general, giving teams of engineers skilled in separate disciplines visual access to each
other's designs helped minimize errors. [Ref. 9: p. 38]
3. Applications of Prototyping Methods
a. Competitive Prototypes
PMs can use prototypes to compare suitability of competing developers'
designs. Competing developers receive the requirement, information about testing
conditions, and evaluation criteria. They design and produce their best effort, then a
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Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) evaluates the competitors' prototypes to
determine the most suitable design.
DOD Instruction 5000.2 required major defense acquisition programs to
contract for competitive prototypes during DEM/VAL. The purpose of this requirement
was to use competition during early design to help develop one or more different design
approaches. The milestone decision authority (MDA) could waive the competitive
prototype requirement. A waiver had to be based on a cost benefit analysis that indicated
competitive prototyping increased technical, supportability, and programmatic risks more
than it decreased cost and schedule risks.*
The U.S. Air Force F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter is a highly visible
example of a competitive prototype strategy. The PM funded two competing contractor
teams to demonstrate high technical risk prototypes. They could use their own mixture of
off-the-shelf equipment and new technologies to control those risks. The source selection
authority (SSA) encouraged contractors to demonstrate additional technologies they
thought would enhance the aircraft's mission or control risk. Competitors submitted their
pre-test estimates of how well they thought their designs would perform. The SSA used
the accuracy of these self-assessments to help determine which contractor team had the
best control over its design process. [Ref. 10: p. 8]
* Since THAAD's Acquisition Strategy was approved at its 21 January 1992 Milestone I Decision, the
DOD Instruction 5000.2 was revised in March 1996. This revised version allows more flexibility in
this area. It now advises "Competitive prototyping and competitive alternative sources shall be used
where practicable."
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b. Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
In June 1994, DOD initiated Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD) programs. The purpose of these applications of prototyping is to
increase the pace at which state-of-the-art technologies get to users. The ACTD program
is not itself a prototyping method, but developers may employ one or more prototyping
methods to demonstrate an available technology. Through the prototype users:
• Can experiment with the technology in their operational environment for up to
two years.
• Develop a better early understanding of how the technology can influence
their tactics, techniques, and procedures.
• Can influence the design while it is still fluid.
An ACTD is not a formal acquisition program, but if the demonstrated
capability is beneficial to users, it may become a formal program. Some DOD guidelines
for ACTD selection are:
• Technology should address a major operational need.
• Technology offered should be sufficiently mature that risks are minimal.
• Users expect a deliverable and affordable system.
• Demonstration should take no more than three years.
• Developers identify, understand, and accept the risks.
• Residual prototypes receive two years of funding after the demonstration.
• Sponsor is fully committed to participation.
There are three possible outcomes for an ACTD:
• User determines the technology does not meet their need or is not suitable.
• User keeps residual equipment and does not request further acquisition.
• User formally requests acquisition of the technology. [Ref. 1 1 : p. 5]
The ACTD program is an improvement over its predecessor, the
Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATD) program. Options available for the
Medium Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) highlight differences.
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As an ATD this program would build two or three air vehicles, test
the system, demonstrate it to users, and then leave them without the new
capability. Under the new ACTD program, a total of 10 UAVs will be
procured to provide a militarily significant quantity for user evaluation and
to assure a residual capability. This could offer important benefits in
today's unsettled world. [Ref. 12: p. 24]
D. PROTOTYPING AS PART OF AN ACQUISITION STRATEGY
A PM must decide when to use prototyping to handle risk. Several recent studies
have provided some indicators that can aid in this decision. This section reviews two of
those studies.
1. Institute for Defense Analysis Prototyping Study
A new program can benefit from the experience of programs that have made it to
production and deployment. One source of empirical evidence is a 1991 Institute for
Defense Analysis (IDA) study of 51 major defense programs during 1971-1991. Of the
5 1 programs, 17 included development of a complete system prototype. The other 34
programs did not include development of either complete system, partial system, or sub-
system prototypes. [Ref. 13: p. A-2, A-3]
The IDA study recommended prototyping for systems that involved:
• new performance or manufacturing technologies for the contractor(s).
• high cost per unit and large production quantities.
• long lead time or high cost to correct potential unforeseen problems.
Figure 3 represents an average of cost data from the 51 programs in IDA's study.
This analysis indicates investment in prototyping helps to control cost risk. Each bar
represents an average ratio of actual cost to estimated cost. The graph groups the ratios by
prototyped and non-prototyped systems during development and production.
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Impact of Prototyping on Cost Growth









Figure 3. Impact of Prototyping on Cost Growth, After Ref. [13]
This graph indicates that both development cost growth and production cost growth were
significantly less for programs that prototyped. Prototyping had more impact on
development cost growth than on production cost growth.
Figure 4 suggests prototyping tended to increase schedule risk. This graph
displays the average of actual months from Milestone I (MS I) and Milestone II (MS II) to
initial operational capability (IOC). Practically all schedule impact occurred during
DEM/VAL. On average, after a MS II decision, there was no significant difference
between the programs that prototyped or those that did not prototype.
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Figure 4. Impact of Prototyping on Schedule, After Ref. [13]
The author's analysis of data on the 51 programs listed in IDA's study reveals
further evidence for the effectiveness of prototyping. The statistics in Table 2 indicate
that prototyping cost additional money up front, but the investment paid big dividends in
the form of less cost risk. More importantly, cost risk in the prototyped programs was
more predictable. The 17 programs that prototyped experienced an average cost growth
of 25%. The 34 programs that did not prototype experienced an average cost growth of
46%. This statistic alone indicates a major advantage of prototyping. However, the
difference between the standard deviations of total cost growth reveals a more valuable
advantage of prototyping. A .25 standard deviation for the 17 programs that prototyped
versus a .57 standard deviation for the 34 programs that did not prototype indicates a
significant reduction in uncertainty in cost growth.
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Risk Management Metric Prototyped Non-prototyped
Number of Programs 17 34
Mean Total Cost Growth (Above Estimate) 25% 46%
Standard Deviation of Total Cost Growth .25 .57
Mean Months From MS I to IOC 127 104
Table 2. Summary of Program Results
2. RAND Corporation Prototyping Study
RAND Corporation produced a 1992 prototyping study for the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition & Technology (USD(A&T)). This study is based on experience
of weapons programs from 1960 to 1991, and during most of this period only traditional
prototyping methods were available. (Rapid component prototyping, software
prototyping, and virtual prototyping methods are recent trends, and their impact is not
separately identified.)
The RAND study suggests the advantages of prototyping in general are:
• Identifies critical system integration issues; decreases technical risk.
• Permits more accurate cost, schedule, and performance estimates; decreases
cost, schedule, and technical risks.
• Reduces cost consequence of proceeding into next phase with poor design;
decreases cost, technical, and supportability risks.
• Allows necessary design changes to be identified early; decreases technical
and supportability risks.
• Helps communicate specifications and intricate designs; decreases technical
risk.
The RAND study also suggests the disadvantages of prototyping in general are:
• Adds two years, on average, from program initiation to IOC; increases
schedule risk.
• Increases preliminary costs; increases early cost risk.
• Delays major funding commitment; increases programmatic risk.
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The RAND study concluded that some form of prototyping is almost always
appropriate. It found that prototyping will generate information to improve the quality of
decision making in an environment of risk and uncertainty. [Ref. 14: p.73]
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter is the framework for an analysis of THAAD's acquisition strategy
and its risk management issues in Chapter IV. The chapter reviewed: (1) DSMC's
approach to risk management in acquisition strategies, (2) some current methods and
applications of prototyping, and (3) two recent studies regarding the role of prototyping in
weapon system development. The recent advances in prototyping methods should
enhance the advantages and reduce the disadvantages of prototyping. These advances
should make prototyping more accessible and valuable in DOD acquisition.
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in. THEATER HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM
A. PURPOSE
This chapter provides a description of the THAAD system. This description is
generally based on program accomplishments and future plans through DEM/VAL flight
test five, which took place in March 1996. It describes: (1) plans for how THAAD will
be used in an operational deployment, (2) the system's four major subsystems, and (3) the
major cost, schedule, and performance differences between the operational prototype and
the objective system. This knowledge ofTHAAD is essential for understanding the
analysis ofTHAAD' s acquisition strategy in Chapters IV and V.
B. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
The U. S. Army Program Executive Office (PEO) for Missile Defense is
developing THAAD as the upper tier of the two tiered Active Defense pillar of joint
theater missile defense. THAAD' s Operational Requirement Document (ORD) calls for
near leak-proof defense, which will provide high confidence of threat intercept. [Ref. 15]
THAAD firing batteries will function in an operational deployment as displayed
in Figure 5. The system has several notable features, which include:
• Autonomous operations or joint operations.
• Early warning and threat cueing to lower tier assets.
• Remote launch capability.
• Hit-to-kill technology.
• Shoot-look-shoot capability. [Ref. 16]
The system may operate in an autonomous mode, or it may operate with external BM/C3I
systems. Among these external interfaces may be an Air Force Command and
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Reporting Center (CRC), the Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS), or a Force
Protection Tactical Operations Center (FPTOC)[Ref. 17]. In either mode of operation,
the system will provide sufficient range to intercept incoming ballistic missiles up to the
edge of the earth's atmosphere.
THAAD will also provide critical early warning to a lower tier missile defense.
Lower tier systems are generally point defense systems that provide much less coverage
than THAAD' s area coverage. The primary land-based lower tier system is PATRIOT
PAC-3, and it may also include Medium Extended-range Air Defense System or an
enhanced U. S. Marine Corps HAWK.
Internally, the tactical operations center for THAAD uses two Battle
Management/Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (BM/C3I) shelters
for force operations (FO) and engagement operations (EO). Multi-use Launcher Control
Stations (LCS) provide communications links to remote launchers, which widens
THAAD' s area of coverage.
The missile uses hit-to-kill technology to destroy its target. THAAD' s interceptor
does not have a warhead, but it relies solely on its ability to find, lock on, and destroy its
target using kinetic energy.
THAAD has a shoot-look-shoot capability. This simultaneously enhances
lethality and missile conservation by making a hit or kill assessment after an initial shot.
With this assessment the BM/C3I element can determine if the interceptor destroyed its
target. If needed, a second interceptor can then be launched.
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C. EQUIPMENT OVERVIEW
THAAD Project Office (TPO) is developing two distinct products. To meet the
legislative mandate, a UOES package will be the first developed and delivered product,
but an objective system is the ultimate product. Table 3, at the end of this chapter,
summarizes the cost, schedule, and performance differences between the two products.
^Fhis acquisition strategy meets the urgent need for fielding increased TMD
capability. The UOES package also supports the achievement ofTHAAD' s operational
requirement by helping to achieve a more suitable objective system. Both UOES and the
objective system have four major subsystems, consisting of launcher, missile, TMD
Ground Based Radar (GBR), and a BM/C3I element. These subsystems interface via a
complete software package, which is approaching one million lines of code, primarily in
the Ada programming language. (The focus of this introductory chapter is on
equipment.) [Ref. 16]
1. Launcher
A tactical launcher subsystem (Figure 6) is mounted on a standard Palletized Load
System (PLS) truck. Use of the PLS truck allows for autonomous reload of eight missile
rounds per pallet. Flight test vehicles (FTV) one through four used a non-tactical interim
launcher, while the remaining ten flight tests will use tactical launchers. Users already
have daily access to the first PLS launcher, which has successfully endured a 300 mile
off-road durability test. This first launcher also supported FTV five. Three more
launchers will be produced under the DEM/VAL contract, and all four will be part of the
UOES package. [Ref. 16]
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Figure 6. THAAD Launcher Mounted on a PLS Truck, From Ref. [16]
2. Interceptor
THAAD' s missile subsystem is composed of three subsystems. These critical
components are missile canister, propulsion system, and kill vehicle (KV). Figure 7
shows the interceptor at the beginning of the boost phase of flight. After assembly, a
missile is housed in its hermetically sealed canister which provides protection during
storage and shipment. The graphite epoxy canister also serves as a launch tube. Once
sealed in its canister, a missile is a certified missile round, which requires no maintenance
for a ten year service life.
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Figure 7. THAAD Flight Test Vehicle Three, From Ref. [16]
The propulsion system consists of a single stage solid propellant booster, a thrust
vector control (TVC) system, and deployable aerodynamic flares. The booster's function
is to deliver its kill vehicle at desired speed and to required altitude for intercept of the
targeted threat. During boost phase, the TVC system steers its missile; this steering
action is detectable in Figure 7 near the top of the missile. The booster's aerodynamic
flares deploy shortly after launch to provide stability during flight. [Ref. 18]
A KV is the only portion that actually intercepts a targeted TBM. It is a software
intensive component that can acquire, lock-on, and then steer itself to intercept. All of
these actions occur in a time frame that may last from seconds to less than four minutes.
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Together the KV and its target have a combined velocity several times the speed of
sound. The KV, which is approximately the front 22 inches of the THAAD missile, uses
only the kinetic energy of the high speed impact to destroy its target. [Ref. 16]
A two piece shroud covers the forecone during endoatmospheric flight. This
shroud reduces aerodynamic drag and protects the seeker window from aerodynamic heat
produced by the KV's high speed flight. Two notable KV features are a gimbal-mounted
infrared (IR) seeker and a Divert and Attitude Control System (DACS). The IR seeker
"looks" through a rectangular uncooled sapphire window that serves as the KV's "eyes,"
while the DACS enables the KV to steer itself to point of intercept. All of these complex
tasks are possible because of an Integrated Avionics Package (LAP) that uses four reduced
instruction-set computing (RISC) computers, which provide the computational speed
required for hit-to-kill guidance. [Ref. 19: p. 44]
3. Theater Missile Defense Ground Based Radar
THAAD uses a state-of-the-art X-band phased array radar that performs multiple
functions. These functions include surveillance, acquisition, tracking and classification,
as well as impact point prediction. The TMD-GBR senses an incoming threat and
provides this information to the BM/C3I element to identify the threat and prioritize
multiple threats. In addition to tracking threat targets, the radar must also track its own
in-flight interceptors and provide in-flight target updates which aid the interceptor in
target homing. A kill assessment follows this sequence of tasks. This assessment aids in
determination of the need for a second THAAD launch or for cueing to a lower-tier
system. Figure 8 shows the radar antenna, cooling equipment unit, electronics equipment
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unit, and operator control unit. Not shown is the prime power unit, which is similar in
size to the cooling equipment unit.
Figure 8. THAAD Ground Based Radar and Support Equipment, From Ref. [16]
4. Battle Management
The BM/C3I subsystem is the integrating component of the THAAD weapon
system, and it provides the interfaces to external systems for Joint Operations. THAAD'
s
BM/C3I units (Figure 9) are mounted on standard High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled
Vehicles (HMMWV). The BM/C3I element uses a Standard Integrated Command Post
System (SICPS) to provide crew and equipment protection from extreme environmental
conditions. Communications systems include: the Joint Tactical Information Distribution
System (JTIDS) for inter-service operations; the Single-Channel Ground and
Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) for internal command and support requirements;
and the Global Positioning System (GPS) for rapid and accurate emplacement. The units
36
Figure 9. THAAD BM/C3I Shelters, From Ref. [16]
come in two configurations, which are the Tactical Operations Station and the Launcher
Control Station. Either configuration may provide workstations for force operations such
as planning, analysis, and logistic support, or it may provide workstations for engagement
operations such as surveillance and battle management. A Launcher Control Station
provides direct communication links for the TOC, or it may serve as a communication
relay to remote launchers or external sensors when a relay is necessary.
D. COMPARISON OF UOES TO THE OBJECTIVE SYSTEM
Table 3 is an unclassified summary of the cost, schedule, and performance of
UOES and the objective system. There have been numerous considerations to increase or
decrease the scope of either product. THAAD' s large budget attracts much attention from
the many other contenders for DOD procurement dollars; consequently TPO has had to
conduct several studies to determine the feasibility of combining some of each product's
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IV. SUMMARY OF THAAD'S ACQUISITION STRATEGY
A. PURPOSE
THAAD's schedule is widely recognized as aggressive. This chapter describes the
key features of THAAD's MS I acquisition strategy and how its features were designed to
handle the risks perceived.
Risk management terms used in THAAD's 1992 acquisition strategy vary slightly
from the terms described in Chapter n. DOD risk management terminology often varies
from program to program. Appendix B relates DSMC's risk management terms to terms
used in THAAD's acquisition strategy.
B. PRE-MILESTONE I ACTIVITIES
1. Late 1980s
A September 1988 Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) memorandum
to U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command (SDC) was a statement of need that requested
the most expeditious approach to develop a THAAD missile. At that time, BMDO
envisioned THAAD as a new missile only, rather than an entire system. BMDO
encouraged leveraging off past missile defense successes by "building on the results of
the High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor (HEDI)...and the Kinetic Kill Vehicle
Integrated Technology Experiment (KITE)." These experiments had proven the hit-to-
kill concept and made significant advancements in infrared seekers, active window
cooling, and forebody cooling. These were the same technologies a THAAD missile
would likely use. [Ref. 20: p. 2]
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The U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School was the user representative, and it
worked closely with BMDO to establish performance requirements in the Operational
Requirements Document (ORD). BMDO suggested that THAAD should "overlay"
existing and future PATRIOT enhancements; later this grew into the upper and lower tier
operational requirement. BMDO also envisioned a significant growth potential for
interoperability and battlefield information sharing. The THAAD missile would be
required to "interface with existing and projected radars, launchers, and BM/C3I
networks." [Ref. 20: p. 2]
The Air Defense School was a strong proponent for significant user participation
in development of the THAAD missile. Regional commanders were demanding better
TBM protection. Earlier in the 1980s, PATRIOT'S PM had experienced major problems
with initial operational testing. Those problems came from lack of user input into the
operations and maintenance concepts. As a result, it required a total of six operational
tests to field PATRIOT. With THAAD, the Air Defense School insisted on greater
participation. [Ref. 21]
2. Early 1990s
In September 1990, shortly after deployments to Operation Desert Shield began, a
second BMDO letter re-affirmed the urgent need for THAAD. This letter formally
initiated the program's Concept Definition (CD) phase. BMDO also enlarged THAAD'
s
scope to develop a complete weapon system rather than a missile only. By January 1991
BMDO accelerated THAAD' s schedule and called for a demonstration system to be
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capable of emergency deployment in 1995. The legislative mandate for an operational
capability was expressed in the Missile Defense Act of 1991. [Ref. 20: p. 2]
THAAD's increased scope and its schedule acceleration were a direct result of
world events. Between 1988 and 1991 the Soviet Union had collapsed, and the emphasis
of U.S. National Military Strategy began to shift toward rapid force projection. This
required greater flexibility in terms of transportability. The only defensive system,
PATRIOT, was air transportable, but it required far more C-5 aircraft than were readily
available. Furthermore, Operation Desert Storm highlighted PATRIOT'S limited TBM
defensive capability. The increased visibility of the growing ballistic missile threat
justified the schedule acceleration and the enlarged size of the program. [Ref. 21]
Three contractor teams participated in CD starting in August 1990. The initial
objectives of this phase were for competing contractor teams to:
• Define technologies and system concepts required for the development of a
cost effective system; this would help control technical and cost risks.
• Conduct system trade studies to optimize design compared to schedule,
technical, and cost risks.
• Specify plans to develop and demonstrate high risk technologies; this would
help identify the most appropriate plan, given high schedule risk.
In December 1991 the competitors delivered their system specifications (Type A)
for their missile, launcher, and BM/C3I element designs. Due to THAAD's aggressive
schedule, TPO also requested the teams' design specifications (Type B) for their missile
and launcher. (B SPECS are usually not delivered until DEM/VAL [Ref. 22: p. 1.1-3].)
They also delivered their recommendations based on their trade studies and their plans to
demonstrate high risk technologies.
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BMDO staffed the ORD through the Joint Requirements Oversight Counsel to the
USD(A&T). The MS I decision came on 28 January 1992 when the USD(A&T)
approved THAAD's Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM). [Ref. 23: p. C-4]
C. MILESTONE I ACQUISITION STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT
1. Expanded CD Phase Objectives
As a result of the program's acceleration and increased scope, the THAAD Project
Office extended the CD phase from December 1991 until May 1992 to perform additional
risk handling or "risk mitigation" activities. During this extension, the contractor teams
developed their:
• Software interface requirements and specifications.
• Software requirements specifications.
• Software development plans. [Ref. 23: p. C-4]
2. Demonstration and Validation
Traditionally the purpose of this phase is to demonstrate critical processes and
technologies. This goal is often accomplished with very limited prototypes that focus on
high risk components. As part ofMS I risk planning, TPO established DEM/VAL
objectives that went far beyond the traditional approach. BMDO's objectives for this
phase were to further develop and integrate technologies into an operational prototype, or
UOES, that would have a useful TMD capability.
The MS I strategy called for the UOES package to include four launchers, four
BM/C3I units, two TMD-GBR radars, and 40 UOES missiles. The prime contractor
would deliver the launchers and BM/C3I units under the DEM/VAL contract. As a
technical and supportability risk control measure, TPO placed the 40 UOES missiles in a
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separate contract option. The strategy called for exercise of that option once the system
demonstrated a useful military operational capability. This arrangement would help TPO
avoid the risk of premature commitment to an immature design.
Exit criteria for DEM/VAL phase included requirements that the contractor
demonstrate, through flight test and simulation, the design's ability to:
• Achieve target acquisition.
• Complete BM/C3I functions.
• Achieve missile burnout velocity.
• Conduct in-flight maneuvers in response to GBR updates.
• Conduct KV terminal homing, or "end game" divert maneuver.
• Perform hit-to-kill intercept.
• Conduct kill assessment.
The strategy established UOES contract option acceptance criteria, which are:
• Successful hardware-in-the-loop (HWIL) demonstrations of guidance and
control systems.
• One guided flight to intercept of a target using a TMD-GBR.
UOES acceptance criteria were a subset of DEM/VAL exit criteria. The strategy called
for a 48 month DEM/VAL phase, which TPO planned to last from fourth quarter fiscal
year (FY) 1992 until fourth quarter FY 1996. MS I estimates called for exercise of the
UOES option in the fourth quarter FY 1995. [Ref. 23: p. C-5]
To control technical and schedule risk, the strategy emphasized an event driven
program rather than a schedule driven program. The event driven feature of the strategy
would help control technical risk by not rushing through the design and interface
processes just to satisfy the legislative mandate. The event driven feature would also help
control schedule and cost risks by allowing the flexibility to accomplish some tasks
before they were scheduled, if that would reduce overall risk. [Ref. 18]
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3. Engineering & Manufacturing Development
The MS I acquisition strategy allocated 30 months for EMD. This upcoming
phase is currently scheduled for October 1998 through March 2001. The focus of
THAAD's EMD is to refine system design, to validate a producible design, and to
validate that the design is fully supportable within the existing Army logistics structure.
During EMD, an operationally deployable THAAD battery will "own" the UOES interim
prototype. The experience in use and testing of UOES equipment will be a valuable
source of user feedback to enhance the objective system's suitability. The objective
system will differ from UOES because it will incorporate design changes resulting from
UOES and EMD testing. EMD objectives include:
• Full qualification of all system components.
• Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP) completion.
• Material Fielding Plan (MFP) completion.
• Functional and physical configuration audits.
• Environmental testing.
• Threat requirements and available technology update. [Ref. 23: p. C-5]
4. Risk Management Structure
The MS I acquisition strategy reflected several coordinated and ongoing risk
planning activities. Risk management for DEM/VAL built upon the objectives that
contractors had met during CD and its five month extension. A risk assessment identified
the watchlist areas that would be the most critical to the program's success.
Table 2 is the author's summary of all the key risk management issues addressed in the
MS I acquisition strategy.
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Facet of Risk Overall Risk Risk Handling
and Watchlist Area Assessment Techniques
Technical Moderate
• Radome heating • Avoid & control by using design based on
existing technology or technology already in
development
• High altitude engagement • Avoid & control by maximum use of
commercial-off-the-shelf items and common
hardware and software
• System integration • Control by encouraging prime contractor
team with subcontract specialists
• Seeker technology • Control by dual sourcing IR seeker and
parallel development of critical components
Supportabilitv Low
• Avoid & control by requiring interface with• Interoperability
existing and projected systems
• Integrated Logistics • Assume by having contractor support UOES
Support (ILS) and deferring some supportability issues
until EMD
• Weight & Size • Avoid by requiring C- 1 30/C- 141 transport
Cost Moderate to
• BM/C3I Software High • Control by design based on existing
technology or technology already in
development
• KV Avionics Package • Control by Monthly Cost Performance
Reports and Quarterly Risk Assessment
Reports & Performance Reviews
Schedule High
• Complete resolution of • Assume & control by developing an
engineering & integration operational, deployable prototype at the end
issues by 4th QTR 95 ofDEM/VAL
• Partially avoid by reducing environmental
requirements until objective system
• Partially avoid for UOES by having
contractor provide all maintenance
• Control by Contract requirements for
• Monthly Cost Performance Reports
• GBR • Quarterly Risk Assessment Report
• Transfer by having NMD develop the radar
and provide a TMD version as Government
Furnished Equipment
Table 4. The Author's Summary of THAAD's MS I Risk Management Structure
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TPO's initial risk analysis found that Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) was a low
risk area for DEM/VAL (although TPO assessed that it would become a critical risk area
during EMD). The strategy required that the contractor establish an ILS Plan (ILSP)
during DEM/VAL, but it did not require a finalized ILSP until MS III. To avoid
additional schedule risk, TPO determined it would be more cost effective to have the
contractor provide all maintenance for the UOES during its planned five year life-cycle.
The objective system is envisioned to use a three-level maintenance concept. The system
will be fully maintainable at the unit by military personnel and will require contractor
support for intermediate and depot maintenance. [Ref. 20: p. 10]
5. Competition And Contracting
Before gaining approval for its acquisition strategy, TPO considered several other
alternatives. To evaluate alternatives, it was essential to separate near and long term
program objectives. In the long term, TPO was required to deploy a complete tactical
system as soon as feasible at affordable cost and acceptable risk. In the near term, by law,
TPO had to complete DEM/VAL as quickly as possible with an operational prototype.
This requirement was far beyond traditional MS II decision requirements; it meant TPO
must resolve operational issues much earlier than in the traditional acquisition approach.
One alternative was competitive prototyping. TPO requested exemption from the
competitive prototype alternative as required by DOD policy. Estimates indicated
carrying two contractors through DEM/VAL could add approximately $1.2 billion to
program cost. Furthermore, duplicate testing would increase schedule risk. These
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additional cost and schedule risks would result in a net risk increase under a competitive
prototype strategy. [Ref. 23: p. C-14].
Another alternative called for two system integration contractors to develop paper
designs or very limited component prototypes during a 12 month period. These designs
would have focused on high risk components, and at the end of the period the contractors
would have submitted the designs for a competitive selection. TPO rejected this
alternative because it increased technical risk. For THAAD, paper designs could not
answer the critical questions:
• Would the concept be feasible?
• Would the design work the way it was supposed to work?
• Will the system provide a useful military capability?
• Will the system meet the performance requirement?
TPO recommended "single source with risk mitigation" as the best alternative
course of action. At the MS I decision TPO gained approval to competitively select a
single THAAD system contractor for DEM/VAL, and that contractor would have sole
source responsibility for all remaining phases. To control a myriad of risks associated
with a single source development and production contract, TPO would fund the
contractor to conduct a risk reduction program, which included implementation of a risk
mitigation plan. This plan would include dual sourcing the IR seeker, parallel
development of critical components, and requiring the prime contractor to maximize
competition at the subcontract level.
The acquisition strategy recommended a cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract for
DEM/VAL because of technical and cost risks associated with integrating a variety of
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leading-edge technologies. For EMD, the strategy recommends a cost-plus-incentive-fee
(CPIF). When THAAD reaches Production and Deployment, the strategy recommends a
firm-fixed-price contract. [Ref. 23: p. C-15]
The basic DEM/VAL contract includes development of four launchers, two
BM/C3I units, 20 flight test missiles, and the software required to achieve exit criteria.
The prime contractor will deliver each of these items whether or not the PM exercises the
UOES contract option. Not included were the GBRs, which were to be provided as GFE.
(Radar development was part of a $492.2 million NMD contract that included
development of a TMD version of the GBR). [Ref. 24: p. 7]
TPO used full and open competition to award the DEM/VAL contract. A
synopsis appeared in the Commerce Business Daily on 10 June 1991 announcing a draft
request for proposal (RFP). The draft proposals that were received were used in writing a
more definitive final RFP. The final RFP went out on 30 January 1992. The Source
Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) evaluated three contractor teams' proposals and
reported its findings to the Source Selection Advisory Council (SSAC). The SSAC's
recommendation went to the Secretary of the Army, the Source Selection Authority
(SSA).
On 4 September 1992 Lockheed Missiles and Space Company (LMSC),
subsequently renamed Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space Company, won the contract.
LMSC is now the prime contractor for the DEM/VAL, EMD, and Production and
Support phases. The contract has an estimated cost of $695.9 million with a fixed-fee of
$57.8 million, or 8.3% [Ref. 25: p. 1].
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The UOES contract option is for 40 contingency capability missiles and the
contractor's maintenance support through the five-year expected life of the UOES.
Estimated cost for the missiles is $73.9 million with a fixed-fee of $6.2 million. The five
years of complete contractor support, estimated to cost up to $90.0 million, will be
included in the EMD contract. [Ref. 25: p. 12]
6. Funding the Contingency Reserve Missiles
Funding for the UOES option has been a complex legal issue that has required
careful management. On one hand, there is a specific legislative mandate that required an
operationally effective TMD capability by 1996. On the other hand, DOD Regulation
7000. 14-R places legal restrictions against using Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E) funds to procure purely operational equipment [Ref. 41: p. 5]. The
appropriated funds required for the basic DEM/VAL contract and the TMD-GBR are
easily classified as RDT&E funds, but funds for the 40 missiles in the UOES option are
not as easily classified. By definition the UOES missiles can not be expended during
developmental testing because they must be available for contingency deployment.
BMDO has addressed this issue by emphasizing the three prioritized purposes for the
UOES. "The UOES will be used for early operational assessment and for soldiers to
influence the final design, but will also be available for use as a contingency capability
during a national emergency [Ref. 26: p. A- 19]." Furthermore, BMDO has recommended
exemption to the restriction to allow the 40 missiles to be kept in contingency reserve and
not used for EMD testing. [Ref. 41: p. 12]
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The innovation found in THAAD's acquisition strategy is its commitment to exit
DEM/VAL with an operational prototype. This chapter presented the features of how
TPO tailored the MS I strategy to address the program's risks. To help handle high risk
technologies, TPO built the strategy upon advancements made in missile defense
experiments in the 1980s. To handle the risks brought on by an aggressive schedule, TPO
extended CD and imposed more stringent exit criteria for each phase. Since competitive
prototyping would take too long and cost significantly more money, TPO was able to gain
approval for a competitive award to one system contractor for DEM/VAL and all
remaining phases. To handle the risks associated with single source procurement, TPO
funded the prime contractor to dual source some critical items, develop others in parallel,
and maximize competition at the subcontractor level.
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V. IMPACT OF THE STRATEGY AND LESSONS-LEARNED
A. PURPOSE
The ultimate evaluation of the effectiveness of THAAD's acquisition strategy will
take place when the system first faces an incoming threat. The final chapter on THAAD
may not be written for many years; however, based on early results, an interim assessment
is possible. This chapter is the author's observations of the tailored acquisition strategy's
impact on key program risks. It begins by citing some examples of what has occurred in
the THAAD UOES program as a result of the TPO's tailoring of the acquisition strategy
to manage key risks. From these observations the chapter develops acquisition
management lessons-learned.
B. OBSERVED IMPACTS OF THE STRATEGY
1. System-Wide Initiatives
a. Commonality
LMSC responded to TPO's stated preference for commercial-off-the-shelf
(COTS) items by incorporating existing DOD equipment wherever possible. Visible
examples of common items are the PLS, the HMMWV, and the SICPS. Examples that
are less noticeable include THAAD's generators, computers, JTIDS and SINCGARS
radios, and GPS receivers. LMSC's use of these common components avoids some
technical risk because these subsystems are already operational. They avoid
supportability risk because they have established training and logistics infrastructure. For
these items, there is practically no cost and schedule risk because LMSC can order them
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from the vendor for an established catalog price. Use of common items helps focus the
development to those items that do not yet exist. With this more accurate view of the
scope of the program, the programmatic decisions can be confined to the truly new
components.
Use of common items presents some increased technical risk. These items
were not specifically designed to perform a TMD function; consequently, THAAD's
design engineers have to work within the limitations of the common items. In the design
process there is a trade-off of performance (some technical risk is assumed) to gain a
decrease in cost, schedule, and supportability risks. THAAD's designers assessed that the
performance objectives could still be achieved while using many common inventory
items. This trade-off resulted in an overall risk reduction for the program.
b. System Integration Laboratory
System integration is a watchlist item that TPO assessed as a moderate risk
at MS I. LMSC, prime contractor for a team of more than 45 specialty subcontractors,
concurred with this assessment. In response to TPO's requirement for a risk mitigation
plan, LMSC developed its System Integration Laboratory (SIL) and Missile Simulation
Laboratory. These two facilities are prime examples of LMSC's exploitation of state-of-
the-art prototyping methods to control technical risks associated with interfacing existing
hardware and software with new hardware and software.
"The SEL provides a high fidelity test lab to verify THAAD subsystem and
system performance in a realistic and programmable combat environment [Ref. 16]."
LMSC and many of its subcontractors use rapid component prototyping to produce a
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design. That design then undergoes hardware-in-the-loop testing, which allows a variety
of testing configurations. The physical or the digital product may be combined with a
prototype of new or revised software modules to test the impact of design modifications
in a virtual or semi-virtual environment. The SEL facilitates integration of all weapon
system hardware and software elements.
"The Missile Simulation Laboratory provides the high fidelity simulated
flight environment necessary for dynamic testing of missile segment components from
launch through intercept [Ref. 16]." This lab permits real-time virtual operation of the
KV's integrated avionics package. These operations are conducted in a simulated flight
environment that closely approximates an actual in-flight environment. The Missile
Simulation Lab provides a means to develop, test, verify, and validate software
algorithms used by an in-flight missile and its KV.
The SIL and Missile Simulation Lab are valuable prototyping facilities that
enable LMSC and its large team of subcontractors to efficiently refine a component's
design and its interfaces with minimal schedule and cost risk. These facilities allow
LMSC to conduct almost continuous testing of every hardware and software component
in every configuration with much less cost and schedule impact than full scale testing.
These labs enhance the value of data collected during full scale testing.
When flight test three did not meet all of its test objectives, LMSC was able to "replay"
the flight test data in the lab. This enabled software and design engineers to trace the
performance deficiency to its root cause, thereby helping to control technical risks.
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2. Impact on Subsystems
a. Interceptor
As part of its risk control activities, TPO funded numerous preflight tests
on various missile components before start of full scale flight testing. The objective of
these preflight tests was to control technical, cost, and schedule risks by verifying a
component's compatibility and functionality without incurring costs associated with
actual flight. Preflight tests began during CD and still take place after each significant
hardware or software change. Several static firings validated the booster's solid
propellant design and the TVC system's ability to steer the missile during boost phase. A
series of "simulated hot launch tests" provided missile launch verification and
demonstrated proper aerodynamic flare deployment. LMSC verified the DACS's ability
to steer its KV in a typical flight scenario through hardware-in-the-loop testing with all
interceptor subsystems on-line. [Ref. 16]
Once LMSC verifies a component's compatibility and functionality, it is
integrated into a complete missile for actual flight testing at White Sands Missile Range.
Original DEM/VAL objectives called for 20 flight tests. The flight tests started with
simple test objectives. Each subsequent test builds on previous lessons-learned and
demonstrates revised versions of software and hardware as they mature.
To control high schedule risk, the PM obtained Milestone Decision
Authority permission to reduce flight tests to 14 because of early testing success. The
original preflight and the flight test programs allowed for some re-testing, if necessary,
with redundant test objectives. Once LMSC met those test objectives the PM
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recommended restructuring the flight test program to eliminate unnecessary testing. The
PM's recommendation was a trade-off to assume some moderate technical risk in order to
lower the program's high schedule risk.
Hit-to-kill technology currently borders between state-of-the-art and
cutting-edge. LMSC is avoiding some technical risks by building THAAD based on
experience in the HEDI and KITE experiments, as well as other missile defense
demonstrations. Designing THAAD 's KV is technically feasible because engineers are
essentially repackaging existing hit-to-kill technology rather than completely developing
new technology [Ref. 15].
Production of KV components is a leading example ofLMSC s use of
rapid prototyping to control technical, cost, and schedule risks. The producibility plan
emphasizes close interaction among all engineering disciplines. From the start of
conceptual design, producibility engineers have continuous access to the designers'
database. This allows for producibility analysis concurrent with system design. When a
producibility problem arises, design engineers take corrective action before they waste
resources on a faulty design. For example, in production of some forecone parts, there
was a paperless transfer of the design to numerically controlled machining tools. The
subcontractor for the shroud that covers the interstage between booster and KV also used
rapid prototyping to design and integrate this critical component. [Ref. 16]
The interceptor is the subsystem that has the highest technical risk.
Schedule pressure increased this risk by forcing reliance on a single contractor for
DEM/VAL and all remaining phases. To control this risk TPO emphasized teaming
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arrangements between LMSC and subcontract specialists. The SIL and the Missile
Simulation lab are LMSC's response to the need for an efficient method to integrate the
various specialists' components to produce the best overall technical system.
Considering early flight test success, this approach of integrating teams of specialists has
helped to control technical risks. This reduction in interceptor technical risk also reduces
the cost and schedule indicators of risk.
b. Ground Based Radar
Major risks for the GBR lie in its extensive use of software. TMD-GBR is
reusing about 300,000 lines of missile defense-related software code [Ref. 27: p. 50].
BMDO and Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) developed this reusable code
during previous missile defense experiments. This code is a starting point for the GBR
prime contractor, Raytheon, to develop a series of evolutionary software prototype builds.
Raytheon works with LMSC in the SIL to integrate these software prototypes with the
other subsystems before flight testing. After a flight test the contractors continue to refine
the software prototype based on its effectiveness to meet that flight test objective.
Software reuse and evolutionary software prototyping techniques have helped control
technical, cost, and schedule risks. [Ref. 28: p. 4-7]
GBR's 1992 operational requirement called for a complete radar set to be
transportable on five C-130s. [This requirement imposed a size and weight limitation
which drove the use of solid-state transmit and receive (T/R) modules in the antenna.]
Each of three DEM/VAL radar antennas contains 25,344 solid-state T/R modules, and
each module contains nine monolithic microwave integrated circuit chips (MMIC). The
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technology used in the T/R modules was not itself a breakthrough; however, assembly of
over 75,000 miniature modules in less than two years was a high technical risk. To
control this risk, GBR's acquisition strategy required the prime contractor to dual source
certain high risk components. Raytheon produced some of the T/R modules and
subcontracted out the remaining portion. To control risk, the PM closely monitored
production of T/R modules on a monthly basis. [Ref. 29: p. 504]
c. BM/C3I
The BM/C3I element, like the KV and GBR, is a software intensive
subsystem, BM/C3I software differs because of its high degree of human interface.
Software for the KV is best designed with input from physicists, but software for the
BM/C3I is best designed with input from soldier operators. The subcontractor for the
BM/C3I element is Litton Industries, and to date it has delivered four operational BM/C3I
shelters. Two units are used to support DEM/VAL flight testing at White Sands Missile
Range. Two more units are used to verify hardware and software interfaces in the SIL.
Soldiers assigned to the first THAAD battery have almost daily access to the systems and
are currently helping design engineers evaluate BM/C3I operator system interfaces. Their
valuable input is part of a growing human factors study that will help to refine suitability
ofTHAAD' s software and hardware. [Ref. 21]
Recent LMSC risk assessment reports list software as having high
technical, cost, and schedule risks. To control these risks Litton also relies on
evolutionary software prototyping techniques. Current plans call for seven major
incremental software builds to achieve full functionality in the objective system. The
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UOES version will use the third major build, which designers expect will contain 372,000
lines of Ada code. This is about half of what the objective system will require [Ref. 27:
p. 50]. To control schedule risk, TPO has at times removed or deferred some functions
from incremental software builds.
Litton controls hardware technical and supportability risks by closely
monitoring throughput and memory utilization. To control high schedule risk for UOES
development, TPO made some risk trade-offs in areas of the program that would require
more time to resolve than was available. For example, TPO was able to gain a waiver for
the requirement for electromagnetic pulse (EMP) hardening of the system. LMSC is
required to resolve these issues as part of a larger "Growth to Objective System" plan.
LMSC and Litton are conducting ongoing trade studies to define the optimum hardware
design for the objective system. [Ref. 15]
Many external interface requirements stem from BMDO's goal to
coordinate all missile defense BM/C3I issues. This goal has increased technical and
programmatic risks for THAAD. For example, the JTIDS radio is an externally driven
hardware requirement. This radio lacks adequate throughput for THAAD to mature to
full objective system capability. TPO projects that the objective system will need
communications throughput capability of one megabit of information in half a second or
less. TPO is currently staffing a request to replace JTIDS with the Secure Packet Radio




Programmatic risk has fluctuated widely, primarily as a function of political
support and perceived threat. Since January 1992, when THAAD's acquisition strategy
was formally approved, there have been some significant external events that have
affected the program. These external events center around three interrelated issues:
(1) the diplomatic regulation of some of the THAAD system's features under the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, (2) the political maneuvering around the definition of the
ballistic missile threat, and (3) the Federal Budget crisis. These three issues have
resulted in much more scrutiny of the THAAD program than was expected back in 1990
and 1991 when the UOES approach was adopted.
There are clear political lines drawn over the validity of the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty. One side of this issue stresses that the Soviet Union no longer exists and the
United States missile defense programs, including THAAD, should not be constrained by
an outdated agreement. This side of the argument also emphasizes that the talented
personnel that built the former Soviet Union's ballistic missile arsenal have dispersed to
many rogue nations around the world. The other side of this issue stresses that much of
the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal still exists and so the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty should remain in effect, constraining THAAD development. Under this thinking,
the most effective method to reduce the threat is through diligent diplomatic negotiations
with the new nations who possess remnants of the Soviet arsenal.
As mentioned in Chapter I, the Clinton administration has downgraded the NMD
program to a Technology Readiness Program. Until June 1995, the GBR was a separate
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NMD project office that would provide the THAAD program with two radars as GFE.
This was a practical approach given the similar functions and design shared between the
TMD and the NMD versions of the radar. In 1994 when the Clinton Administration
downgraded NMD to a Technology Readiness Program, TPO began to assume most of
the $492.2 million responsibility for development of its own radar [Ref. 31: p. 89]. Since
June 1995, GBR has been a product office within the TPO.
This project office merger was a programmatic risk for the program in that it
meant increased development responsibility for TPO. GBR was also in DEM/VAL, but
its acquisition strategy called for a competitive selection for the EMD contract. Raytheon
was not under contract to develop an objective system; its focus was only to deliver three
DEM/VAL operational prototypes, which would consist of one NMD version and two
TMD versions. TPO had to modify Raytheon's contract to include concurrent work on an
objective system. For the remainder of DEM/VAL Raytheon and LMSC have an
associate contract relationship. This new arrangement required the two contractors to
exchange technical information, as needed, based on an information exchange agreement.
There are political lines drawn around the issue of ballistic missile threat. One
side of the debate emphasizes the intelligence assessments that a threat to the United
States already exists, or it will exist in less than five years. The other side of the debate
emphasizes that some intelligence estimates indicate that a ballistic missile threat is not a
significant concern for 15 or more years. This continuing debate creates uncertainties
about the future of the THAAD' s objective system.
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Programmatic risks, as evidenced by changing policy, continue to be high. For
example, from November 1995 until February 1996 DOD conducted a complete review
of all missile defense programs. In mid-November PEO for Missile Defense
recommended a two year acceleration of the objective system [Ref. 32: p. 4]. By early
January this proposal became known as the "THAAD lite," which would be a reduced
capability objective system [Ref. 33: p. 3]. However, the SEC DEF had a news
conference on February 16, 1996 to announce changes as a result of the missile defense
review. The result was significantly different from the PEO's recommendation. In that
conference the SEC DEF announced:
• The objective system will lose about $2 billion out of what was a $5 billion
program through the future years defense plan (FYDP).
• The objective system will be delayed.
• The UOES will be enhanced with some seeker and radar improvements.
• In two years, after Navy Upper-Tier completes CD phase, it will
consider a marinized version ofTHAAD' s missile to use on the Aegis
missile defense platform. [Ref. 34: p. 6]
All of this political and diplomatic maneuvering leads to high programmatic risk
for UOES and the objective system. In the short term, for UOES, the additional
development responsibility increased technical, supportability, schedule, and costs risks.
In the long term, development and delivery of the full objective system is at risk. Early
successes within the UOES portion of the program fostered a perception that perhaps
some of the funding for the objective system was unnecessary or that it could be deferred
with little consequence. Programmatic risks are inherently unpredictable, and many of
THAAD' s other types of risk are traceable to external requirements that are beyond
TPO's span of control.
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4. Cost And Schedule Growth
As typical of most programs, THAAD has experienced both cost and schedule
growth. Chapter II indicated some expected cost and schedule outcomes for programs
that make extensive use of prototypes (Figures 3 and 4 as well as Table 2).
As of March 1996, the DEM/VAL contract estimate at completion is
approximately $1.2 billion (this figure includes the UOES option and the five years of
maintenance that will be added to the EMD contract)[Ref. 35]. The program is primarily
event driven, but it is about 12 months behind the original schedule [Ref. 35]. It is still
too early in the program and beyond the scope of this thesis to determine exactly what
portion of the cost and schedule growth is attributable to what types of risk. However,
based on observation of the contractor's response to the strategy and events that have
occurred since MS I, an interim assessment of cost and schedule follows.
The CPFF contract DEM/VAL including the UOES option was based on a total
price of $923.8 million. The current estimate at completion is $1.2 billion, so it appears
that there is about $276 million in cost growth. However, the largest portion of this cost
growth is traceable to the increased scope of work related to development of the GBR.
Both the LMSC and Raytheon contracts have thus had major modifications, and resolving
these modifications is an ongoing issue. Estimates indicate that the additional cost
traceable to GBR will exceed $200 million. Another increased scope of work is related to
electromagnetic pulse hardening of the UOES equipment. This additional requirement
will add several million dollars to THAAD 's development cost. This requirement is a
result of recent considerations to use the UOES system longer than its planned five year
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life. The UOES equipment does not contain many of the features of the objective system,
and therefore additional requirements lead to high supportability and cost risks.
Initial assessments of THAAD's schedule as "aggressive" have proven to be
accurate. The twelve month schedule growth is almost solely attributable to software
issues among the interceptor, GBR, and BM/C3I elements. The contractors continue to
employ teams of specialists in this critical program area and rely on proven methods, but
schedule risk is usually very high for complex software [Ref. 36: p. 52].
C. LESSONS-LEARNED
The following list of lessons-learned come from the author's observations of what
has occurred thus far in the THAAD program. This list is an overall interim assessment
of the acquisition strategy based on events and actions from the first statement of need in
1988 until March 1996.
• Use of common existing inventory items as subsystems helps avoid some
technical risk. Because those subsystems are already operationally effective and
suitable systems, they help avoid supportability risk with an established training and
logistics infrastructure. For these items, there is very little cost and schedule risk
because the items may be provided as GFE or separately purchased from a vendor.
Use of common items helps isolate the scope of the development to those functions
that do not yet exist.
• Use of common existing inventory items can also increase technical risk. Existing
inventory items are, by definition, not specifically designed to perform THAAD's
TBM function. Design engineers had to work within limitations of the existing
system's capability and assumed some technical risk in a trade-off for lower cost,




Funding a contractor for a system integration initiative can help maximize the
benefits from component, software, and virtual prototyping methods. This can
help control schedule and cost risk through virtual or semi-virtual testing to avoid
commitment to a testing program until interface of the hardware and software
components can be established. An integration facility can help control technical risk
by efficiently optimizing an overall system design. It can increase the value of actual
testing by providing the means to conduct in-depth analysis of actual test data to help
identify a root cause of a performance deficiency.
Software technical risks can be partially controlled by reusing the existing
software of systems that have similar functions. For THAAD, reused software
became a starting point for a series of evolutionary software prototype builds, which
helped to control technical, schedule, and cost risks.
Rapid prototyping, combined with hardware-in-the-loop testing, enables a
variety of design configurations with minimal cost and schedule risk. Use of
rapid prototyping methods helped control technical risks by allowing technical
designers to communicate their design more efficiently to non-technical audiences. In
THAAD, rapid prototyping is credited for helping to control technical and schedule
risk by providing for a paperless transfer from design equipment to numerically
controlled machining tools.
Test objectives should be incremental, allow for integration of revised versions of
hardware and software, and take advantage of simulation in testing. A thorough
preflight test program enabled TPO to verify hardware and software components'
compatibility and functionality after each significant configuration change and before
start of full scale testing. TPO used the preflight test to control technical, schedule,
and cost risks. When LMSC accomplished some test objectives early, TPO was able
to partially control high schedule risk by assuming moderate technical risk.
Reconfiguration and refinement of existing technologies can help to control
technical and schedule risks. Rather than completely developing new technology,
TPO required the prime contractor to avoid some technical risks by building THAAD
based on proof of concept that occurred in previous missile defense experiments.
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• Programs on very aggressive schedules often have to make concessions in some
functional areas to achieve the schedule requirement. TPO recognized early that
there was not sufficient time to establish and refine a logistics support plan for the
UOES. Before MS I TPO conceded that the contractor would have to provide this
function. To control technical and supportability risks associated with this
operational concession, TPO required the prime contractor to develop and maintain a
Growth to Objective System plan, which established clear paths of development from
UOES to the objective system.
If a program must rely on a single source for development and production, the
PM should take significant precautionary measures to control the risk associated
with sole source procurement. TPO emphasized teaming arrangements, and LMSC
is essentially the program integrator for a team of 45 specialists. To control risk TPO
funded LMSC to develop a risk mitigation plan, which includes the SIL and the
Missile Simulation Lab. Other precautionary measures included: dual sourcing
certain high risk components; developing parallel designs until the best one is
identified; and funding trade studies in high risk functions to identify an optimal
design.
Programmatic risk receives too little consideration during risk management
planning. Strong political support initially gave the legislative mandate that resulted
in a UOES operational prototype strategy. Four years later, decreased political
support resulted in increased programmatic risk. Now the objective system may not
be fielded until much later than originally planned, or the objective system may have
much less performance capability than originally planned. The recent DOD-wide
missile defense review announcement confirms one of the disadvantages of
prototyping in that it delays a full funding commitment. Programmatic risk associated
with the NMD program resulted in increased technical, supportability, schedule, and
cost risks for UOES. The GBR is now back on track and keeping pace with
THAAD's schedule, but in 1994 and 1995 the outcome was uncertain.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
This thesis is an early examination of the THAAD program's implementation of
the User Operational Evaluation System acquisition strategy. It developed a framework
for analysis of UOES risk management issues using DOD risk management guidance.
This framework incorporates some current methods, applications, and trends in the roles
prototypes play during development. Using that framework, it analyzes the observed
impact ofTHAAD 's tailored acquisition strategy on the program thus far. From these
observations it listed lessons that have been learned from the program's experience, and
the author offers the following general conclusions and recommendations.
B. CONCLUSIONS
• The User Operational Evaluation System acquisition strategy is a special
response to a unique situation.
An analysis of the situation that resulted in the UOES approach supports this
conclusion. The BMDO planners had to tailor an acquisition strategy to meet the 1991
legislative mandate for "an operationally effective TMD capability by 1996." This
mandate was a result of a growing political concern for ballistic missile defense at home
and for forward deployed U.S. forces. This unique and urgent mandate combined with
restrictions imposed by the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty limited the range of options
available. A traditional acquisition strategy could not produce a fieldable system until
several years beyond 1996. A UOES approach would be much faster because it would
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rapidly develop only core capabilities. The strategy is based on the premise that schedule
risk was decreased for UOES because it does not include final plans for logistics,
training, and full operational capability of the objective system.
• An operational prototype strategy shifts much of the technical and
supportability risks related to operational requirements forward
in the acquisition cycle.
An example of this is that design specifications were part of the DEM/VAL
competitive proposal process. Typically, no more than system specifications are required
at the end of CD. This accelerated requirement increased technical and supportability risk
by requiring designers to commit to a particular design much earlier in the acquisition
cycle than this critical step usually occurs. Another example is that the system has to
achieve a limited operational capability before MS n. To partially offset this increased
risk, the TPO has required parallel development of some critical components to allow for
a ready alternative if the primary design is not technically feasible or supportable. Both
of these requirements resulted in increased development schedule and costs.
• An operational prototype strategy increases programmatic risk by
creating an alternative to commitment to full objective system
funding.
This conclusion is consistent with the findings discussed in Chapter n, and for
THAAD this conclusion is evident from the programmatic events that have occurred
since 1991. BMDO planners did not adequately consider long-term programmatic risk
when they adopted the UOES approach. Long-term success hinged on a limited UOES
capability to temporarily meet the requirement, while designers would use experience
gained from its operation to help develop a more robust objective system. Now, five
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years after selection of the UOES approach it appears the UOES is going to be kept
longer, and the scope of that portion of the program will be enlarged at the expense of the
objective system.
• DOD's Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration now
addresses many of the same objectives that the UOES attempted to
achieve.
:Both approaches have overlapping goals in that: (1) user experience gained from
operating the system is used to help refine a more suitable final product, (2) if needed, the
system is available for a contingency mission.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
In the course of this thesis research, the author identified several promising areas
for future research.
• Determine how THAAD's cost and schedule performance compare
to the cost and schedule performance of other programs that did
or did not prototype.
THAAD has experienced cost and schedule growth. A study should be conducted
when the program completes DEM/VAL, which is now projected for 1997. This study
should first define if UOES, with its contractor-provided maintenance concept, can be
realistically compared with other systems that use the traditional definition of IOC. The
study could determine what portion of the cost and schedule growth is attributable to
increased requirements, inaccurate estimates, and from programmatic changes. The study
could recommend improvements to UOES and ACTD acquisition approaches to help
better control cost and schedule risks.
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• Determine the effectiveness of operational prototypes to influence
the objective system's design.
A starting point might be to analyze how these acquisition strategies actually
impacted mission effectiveness to determine:
• What are the additional risks associated with fielding a less than
mature system?
• What are the recommended management structures used to control
these types of programs?
• What is an effective method for collecting and implementing user
suggestions?
• Investigate software reuse across missile defense programs.
In THAAD, the GBR and the BM/C3I reused a significant portion of existing
software code. This investigation could include:
• a comparison of other organization's reuse policy to BMDO's reuse
policy.
• a comparison of the architectures other real-time information systems.
• a recommendation for policies concerning missile defense software
architecture.
• Study how to maintain a standardized communication
architecture in the rapidly expanding demand for frequency
bandwidth.
THAAD objective system will require more throughput than the current standard
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System can provide. This study could include:
• a review of current and projected DOD needs.
• a review of the projected technological break-throughs that DOD
communications planners should be prepared for.
• a recommendation for how to efficiently take advantage of
technological innovation.
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APPENDIX A. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS
DEFINITIONS
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration - an integrating effort to assemble and
demonstrate a significant, new military capability, based upon maturing advanced
technology(s), in a real-time operational environment at a scale adequate to clearly
establish operational utility and system integrity. The purpose of an ACTD is to address
problems in acquisition, system development and product transition. The ACTD
approach is designed to transfer mature technologies rapidly from the developers to the
users[Ref. 11: p.5]. An ACTD is not an acquisition program, has no firm operational
requirements, nor a firm Contingency Operations Plan (CONOPS) [Ref. 37: p. 7].
design - (verb) to make preliminary sketches of, a sketch a pattern, or outline for.
- (noun) a plan; a thing planned for or outcome aimed at. [Ref. 38: p. 373]
effectiveness - the performance or output received from an approach or a program.
Ideally, it is a quantitative measure which can be used to evaluate the level of
performance in relation to some standard, set of criteria, or objective [Ref. 39: p. B-4].
evaluation - the process whereby data are logically assembled and analyzed to aid in
making systematic decisions [Ref. 39: 14-1].
external forces - program factors that he outside a PM's span of control, although a PM
may have some limited influence over these factors. Examples include events,
technologies, funding support, or user requirements that are critical to a program's
success and influence its direction.
internal forces - any program factor that a PM can directly control.
leverage - to increase the means of accomplishing some purpose, largely through the use
of borrowed ideas or technologies.
operational prototype - a prototype that can deliver some degree of useful military
capability, but a capability that is less than the full operational capability that is required
in the system's Operational Requirement Document [Ref. 37: p. 7].
system - a composite, at any level of complexity, of personnel, procedures, materials,
tools, equipment, facilities, and software. The elements of this composite entity are used
together in the intended operational or support environment to perform a given task or
achieve a specified production, support or mission requirement [Ref. 39: B-12].
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User Operational Evaluation System - an operational feature of a program's acquisition
strategy that provides for early user involvement to influence the objective system design
and may provide for the war-fighter a military useful interim contingency option. A
UOES is not an ACTD. A UOES is embedded within an approved acquisition program.
The approved acquisition program is based on firm operational and developmental
requirements as well as an approved Contingency Operation Plan (CONOPS) [Ref. 37: p.
n
user - the user is generally regarded as the combat or operator community for which the
system is being acquired. The ultimate user is the regional war-fighting Commander's in
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Lockheed Missiles and Space Company
low rate initial production
milestone decision authority
Medium Extended-range Air Defense System
Material Fielding Plan
monolithic microwave integrated circuit chips
Mission Need Statement
Milestone
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Missile Defense
National Missile Defense Ground Based Radar
operational requirements document





project or program manager


























Standard Integrated Command Post Shelter
System Integration Lab




source selection evaluation board
tactical ballistic missile
theater high altitude area defense
theater missile defense






user operational evaluation system
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
United States Marine Corps
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APPENDIX B. RISK MANAGEMENT TERMINOLOGY
Chapter II' s outline of Risk Management in DOD is based on DSMC's 1989 Risk
Management Guide; THAAD's acquisition strategy was approved in 1992; and the DOD
Regulation 5000.2 was updated in 1996. Each document uses slightly different risk
management terms. This table summarizes the terms used, and for the objective of this




























The most important difference is the shift in risk handling activities. The new
term for risk handling is "risk reduction," which is accomplished through "risk
mitigation." Risk mitigation is a broad term that may include any of the previous
techniques of avoidance, control, assumption, and transfer.
Each of these three documents serves a different purpose. DSMC's 1989
document is a comprehensive "Risk Management Guide" and it contains the most detail.
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The 1996 DOD-R 5000.2 is another comprehensive document, but its sole purpose is not
risk management, and it naturally will not contain as much risk management detail.
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